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Abstract 
 
The paper provides an empirical analysis of the growth performance of transition countries in a 
comparative perspective, separating episodes of crises from those of growth. Performance is 
measured by the output response following recessions, rather than average rates of growth that 
aggregate periods of recessions and periods of growth. Results highlight significant differences 
between transition and non-transition countries, and heterogeneity within the transition group. 
Distinguishing the performance following the so-called “transitional recession” from that of 
“normal recessions”, the analysis allows separating the role of initial conditions, pre-transition, 
from the effects determined by the economic structure that emerged after the launch of market 
reforms. The post-recession behavior of output in Central-Eastern Europe resembles that of 
emerging and developing countries in the aftermath of banking and financial crises, often following 
significant liberalizations. In contrast, the post-crisis performance of CIS countries resembles the 
output response observed during episodes of civil wars, and remains significantly different from the 
normal response of an average market country. Therefore, the ability to rebound after a crisis is a 
key element of the growth performance of different transition countries. Furthermore, we 
distinguish three components of the growth performance associated to a crisis, namely the capacity 
to rebound, the depth and the length of the crisis. We observe that such performance depends on 
economic reforms and especially on the complementarities among different reforms.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Twenty years of transition have produced highly different effects across transition countries. 
Different initial conditions justify part of such differences. Most observers would agree that the 
different depth of the so-called “transitional recession” -- using Kornai’s terminology -- may be due 
to such initial conditions. However, more complicated is to explain the different performance 
during the recovery period following the initial fall in output. One could have expected that those 
countries initially harder hit would have displayed a steeper recovery. More generally, contrasting 
the experience of transition countries with that of other countries going through episodes of 
recessions and crises, one would have assumed that the specificity of transition should have 
emerged in the form of a steep recovery following the output collapse, as the movement to a market 
economy would have produced enormous efficiency gains. During the 1990s some explanations 
were provided for the persistence of the output decline and for the poor post-recession performance 
(see Campos and Coricelli, 2002, for an overview).  In this paper, we focus on empirical evidence 
and use a comparative approach by analyzing transition countries within a broad cross-country 
sample.  
We address three main issues: (i) how did the “transitional recession” compare with other 
episodes of deep recessions in non-transition countries? (ii) What role did the “transitional 
recession” play for the subsequent process of growth? (iii) What role did reform/liberalization 
policies play in transition countries, and more specifically did the complementarities among reforms 
matter?  
The first question involves an assessment of the specificity of the transition experience. Is 
switching from a planned to a market economy radically different from, for instance, transforming a 
system from an agrarian economy into an industrial economy? The second question concerns the 
role of the initial output fall in explaining the subsequent recovery and growth. Did the depth and 
persistence of the initial output fall affect the characteristics of the output dynamics in the following 
period?  
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The third question raises the issue of whether and to what extent the effects of policies depend on 
the magnitude of the initial distortions and the pervasive nature of such distortions, which affect all 
areas of the economy. Indeed, it is legitimate to assume that planned economies were characterized 
by extreme distortions, linked to the absence of markets and the dominance of the state in the 
economy. Should we expect that freeing the economy from these huge distortions would determine 
a very strong growth effect? Is there a role for policy complementarities in a world characterized by 
huge and widespread distortions? 
The three issues addressed in the paper are inspired by the so-called “unified theory of 
growth and development”, recently put forward by Parente and Prescott (2005). In such approach, 
growth and development are considered a process going through different regimes, characterized by 
institutional and policy factors which determine the growth performance of a country. The main 
idea is that at each point in time countries can potentially exploit a “world technology”, which 
describes the technological frontier available in each period in history. However, national 
institutions and policies determine whether a country is capable of exploiting such technological 
frontier. Defining a “Malthus regime”, as a regime under which output per capita stagnates, and a 
“Solow regime”, as the regime under which output per capita grows over time, the growth dynamics 
of a country can be analyzed as a process characterized by a regime switch. Such switch occurs at 
different points in time for different countries. For this reason, a cross section analysis would 
identify large differential productivity growth and productivity levels across countries. Furthermore, 
a time series of growth for a given country would identify structural breaks with accelerations of 
growth. Institutions and policies determine the timing of the regime switch and the extent to which 
a country is capable of moving close to the world technology frontier. Transition fits extremely well 
such unified approach, as transition is perhaps the most important example of regime switch 
observed in the 20th century.1   
                                                 
1
 It is remarkable that the model advanced by Parente and Prescott  is very close in spirit to the models of transition 
proposed at the start of transition  such as Aghion and Blanchard (1994) and, perhaps even more, Chadha and Coricelli 
(1997). 
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From an empirical perspective, the transition experience accords with recent analyses of 
growth that emphasize the relevance of distinguishing periods of positive growth and periods of 
recessions. Indeed, to understand the performance of a country it is also important to evaluate the 
relationship between the recession and the subsequent phase of recovery and growth. Does 
recession positively affect subsequent growth, through a Schumpeterian cleansing effect, or does 
recession negatively affect subsequent growth, leading to adverse long run effects? 
In this paper we address the above issues by focusing on the growth performance of 
transition countries in a comparative setting. After the initial transitional recession, transition 
countries were affected by several recessions associated with the typical shocks identified as causes 
of recessions in markets economies: banking and currency shocks, civil wars, political changes. We 
investigate whether transition countries display a different dynamics in relation to such shocks. 
Such different performances may be explained by several factors, relating either to different initial 
conditions or to different path of economic and/or political reforms. Recent literature (Campos and 
Coricelli, 2009) has emphasized the heterogeneity in the paths of political reforms implemented in 
transition countries. Such different political paths may help to explain different economic outcomes. 
Along these lines, it has been argued that not only there exists a link between economic crises and 
economic reforms, but also that political crises may explain economic reform trajectories and thus 
economic performance (Campos, Hsiao and Nugent, 2009; see also Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005, 
Furman and Stiglitz, 1998, Drazen and Easterly, 2001, and Pitlik and Wirth, 2003). In this paper we 
do not address directly the importance of such political dynamics. We focus on main areas of 
economic reforms as determinants of economic performance, implicitly assuming that the political 
dynamics affect performance through their effect on economic reform. Specifically, we analyze 
whether different dynamics for transition countries might be explained by the presence of “reform 
complementarities”, as transition countries needed to implement a much larger set of reforms 
compared to market economies (see also Braga de Macedo and Oliveira-Martins, 2008 and Braga 
de Macedo et al., 2010). Rather than looking at a broad range of heterogeneous, and often ill-
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measured reforms (see Campos and Horvath, 2006), we focus on those key dimensions of the 
reform process, namely reforms in the financial sector and trade liberalization, on which there are 
somewhat robust results in the literature (Christiansen et al., 2010). Furthermore, within financial 
sector reforms we distinguish different dimensions, highlighting either institutional progress or 
liberalization policies. These two types of reforms may have different impacts and, more 
importantly, they may have different impacts depending on whether they are implemented 
simultaneously or in an unbalanced and piecemeal way. 
Our results indicate that: (i) for Central-Eastern Europe the transitional recession looks 
similar to episodes of crises in emerging and developing countries associated to banking and 
financial crises, often following significant liberalizations. In contrast, for CIS countries, the 
transitional recession resembles the output response observed during episodes of civil wars. This 
evidence suggests that the shift from a planned to a market economy did not “unleash prosperity”.2 
This large difference between the performance of CEE and CIS countries could be interpreted in 
two ways. The first is that “structural” initial conditions were much less favorable for CIS countries. 
The second is that reform policies were implemented in a more rapid and more broad-based fashion 
in CEE countries. This view emphasizes the role of reform complementarities.  The two 
interpretations might be reconciled, if one assumes that a main difference in initial conditions were 
related to the presence in CEE  of some forms of liberalizations and of markets prior to the full-
fledged transition (see Campos and Coricelli, 2002).  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we analyze the transitional recession in a 
comparative perspective. Section 3 contains the empirical results on growth, crisis and recovery for 
a world sample. Dummies for the two main groups of transition counties, CEEs and CIS, are used 
to evaluate the presence of specific factors related to transition. Section 4 discusses the role of 
reform policies and in particular of reform complementarities in Central-Eastern Europe, focusing 
on the financial sector. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
2
 Borrowing a term used in a recent analysis by the World Bank on the growth process in transition countries (World 
Bank (2008)). 
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2. Transitional recession in a comparative perspective 
Transitional recession is defined as the output fall that occurred after the launch of policies of 
liberalization and market reforms in formerly planned economies. The starting dates of transition 
differ across countries, with Central and Eastern European countries launching the reform programs 
during 1990-1991, and the CIS countries launching such programs in 1992. An additional 
complication for the cross-country comparison is that in the former Soviet Union output began to 
fall before transition, namely with the start of Perestroika. In Table 1 the recessions experienced by 
transition countries can be seen in a comparative perspective, over the period from 1960 to 2001.  
It is remarkable that the cumulative decline for transition countries is by far the largest in the 
whole sample. Note that this is an average cumulative decline and thus it is affected by the milder 
drop in CEEs. If we were to separate CIS from CEEs, we would obtain an even sharper result. 
Therefore, the first observation is that the “transitional recession” is unique in its magnitude during 
the last half century. Furthermore, the duration indicates that the “transitional recession” has also 
been the more persistent recession in a comparative perspective.  
Table 1. Characteristics of Recessions 
 
Cumulative loss of GDP Duration (years) Number of observations 
All country episodes -7.5 1.62 637 
Low income -7.1 1.58 259 
Low middle income -10 1.84 163 
Upper middle income -8.6 1.67 97 
High income -4.1 1.38 118 
Crisis -6.8 1.64 182 
Banking crisis -11.7 2.19 104 
Trade liberalization -7.6 1.79 141 
New government -12.8 2.08 74 
Civil Wars -17.4 2.42 60 
Financial liberalization -3.1 1.23 43 
International Capital Flows -3.6 1.32 53 
Partial financial liberalization -5.6 1.58 24 
Partial Capital liberalization -6.0 1.53 43 
Africa -6.6 1.52 243 
Asia -6.0 1.39 93 
Industrial country -2.2 1.38 74 
Latin America -6.0 1.55 74 
Middle East -11.1 1.40 47 
    
CISa -35.6 4.56 18 
CEECsa -19.3 2.88 16 
         Source: Cerra and Saxena (2008); a: Authors’calculations 
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The second observation is that the magnitude of the output decline in transition is 
comparable – actually deeper – than that observed during episodes of civil war. 
The difference between CEECs and CIS countries has been huge: the cumulative loss of 
GDP from peak-to-trough during the transitional recession in CIS countries has been 35.6 %, and 
lasted 4.56 years, while in CEEs has been 19.3% and lasted 2.88 years. The recovery period to 
regain the initial level has been 10 years in CIS countries and 3 years in CEEs.3  
Two main observations stand out. First, not only the “transitional recession” has been much 
deeper in CIS countries, but its persistence has been much higher as well. To find such a pattern one 
has to look at African countries involved in civil wars. As in civil wars, it is likely that transition 
involved a huge destruction of resources, which was not compensated by the creation of new 
productive capacity. Second, there were several episodes of recession after the initial period of 
transitional recession. The Russian crisis was one of the main factors determining crises throughout 
the region. However, there were several recessions associated with banking and currency crises 
affecting both CEECs and CIS countries (see Appendix 3).  
In the next section we analyze econometrically the behavior of output following crises. The 
sample includes a broad set of countries, not only transition countries. This will allow us to identify 
possible differences in behavior of transition countries. To account for the specificity of transition 
countries, we carry out the analysis distinguishing the transitional recession from “normal” crises. 
The objective is to assess in a comparative perspective the performance of transition countries after 
episodes of crises.  
 
3. Recession and recovery in a comparative perspective: Econometric analysis 
 
We look at the growth experience across the world during the period 1960-2007. We follow the 
methodology used by Cerra and Saxena (2008), and extend the sample they used to include the 
                                                 
3
 Appendix 1 displays the output performance in all transition countries. 
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transition countries that were not included in their sample. We extend as well the sample period 
from 2001 to 2007.  
3.1. Data 
In the analysis the dependent variable is real GDP per capita. The series are taken from 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank, complemented for the last years by the World 
Economic Oulook of the IMF. Banking crisis dates are taken from Leaven and Valencia (2008), 
while those for civil war are taken from Sarkees (2000).4 The dataset identifies the participants of 
intrastate wars. Our dummy variable for internal conflict is set equal to one for a country in the 
years of conflict and zero otherwise. The dummy for trade liberalization is formed from the dates of 
trade liberalization available in Wacziarg and Welch (2008). We assign a value of zero to pre-
liberalization years and unity to the year of trade liberalization and subsequent years. We obtain 
measures of financial liberalization from the Financial Reform database compiled by the IMF's 
Research Department (Abiad et al., 2008). Data on change in government comes from Polity 
International, and defines the durability of a government. The dummy variable takes a value of one 
when the durability variable is zero.  
3.2. Empirical analysis 
The objective of our empirical analysis is to assess whether the extraordinary recession 
emphasized in the previous section has been followed by rebounds large enough to allow countries 
to recover fast and thus regain the pre-transition period level of GDP.  
Our basic assumption is that the condition under which output losses following recessions are fully 
reversed is that the rate of growth itg  during the year (or two years) after the crisis is significantly 
higher than the typical positive rate of growth before and after the crisis. In that case, the rebound 
will allow a country that experienced a crisis to recover rapidly to its former trend line.  
Therefore, we estimate the output response following recessions, and we consider that the slope of 
the recovery immediately following a recession measures the long-run effects of recessions. In 
                                                 
4
 “Correlates of War Intra-State War Data, 1816–1997” (v3.0), which is available at www.correlatesofwar.com. 
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order to measure the slope of the recovery we define a “trough” variable tiTrough , which is a 
dummy variable set equal to one when a year of negative growth occurs and is followed 
immediately after by a year of positive growth; it is zero otherwise5. The estimated equation is as 
follows:  
 
( ) ( ) ittiKKtiiitit uTroughDTroughgg +++=> −− 1,1, ***0 ββα  
If β is negative or even nil, output fails to revert to its trend line. A necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for the GDP level to revert to its pre-recession trend level is that β
 
is significantly 
positive.  
The panel structure of the dataset permits to exploit the time variation of growth within each 
country. We allow the average rate of growth to differ across countries by imposing heterogeneous 
intercepts (using fixed effects) in the panel of annual growth rates, but we pool information on 
growth in the recovery phase by imposing a homogenous slope ( β ).  
The pooled estimate provides summary information about the typical response, even if we can 
expect a variation around it. This variation is measured through an interaction term 
( )1,* −tiK TroughD , where the dummy KD  is one for a particular set of countries, transition countries 
for instance, or countries that experienced trade or financial liberalizations. This allows us to 
determine whether the reversal from a crisis has been significantly different from the typical 
response, according to the type of crisis or to the type of country.  
Our results on the whole sample confirm the results by Cerra and Saxena (2008, Table 3, page 26): 
recessions tend to have a negative effect on the immediate post-recession growth6. By running two 
separate regressions for the period 1961-1992 and for the period 1992-2007, we observe that the 
magnitude of such negative effect is much larger during the 1990s, suggesting that the adverse 
effects of recessions have been stronger in recent years.  
                                                 
5
 We can consider also that the “recovery phase” can be more than one year of positive growth after the recession. In 
that case, the trough variable will have value of 1 for more than one year after the crisis. 
6
 It remains negative even when we consider the average growth slope over two (three) years after the recession.  
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Our guess is that this result can be imputable, at least partially, to the presence of transition 
recessions in the sample. We directly verify this conjecture in Table 2 by including an interaction 
term for transition countries. Such interaction term has indeed a significant negative sign, and 
although the estimated coefficients β  are still different before and after 1992, the difference is 
much smaller than in the regression without transition countries dummy. This suggests that 
transition countries account for most of the increase in the negative effect of recessions found in the 
post-1990 period.  
From the perspective of transition countries, the above results suggest that recessions in 
transition countries have a strong negative and long-lasting effect on post-recession growth rates, 
pointing to the lack of evidence on the presence of creative destruction in transition countries.  
 
Table 2: Strength of Recoveries before and after 1992 
 
Authors’ calculations Cerra and Saxena (2008, Table 3, 
page 26) 
 
62-92 92-07 62-92 92-07 62-89 90-01a 
Dummy trough lagged :  
Troughi,t-1
 
-0,375* 
(0,240) 
-1,017*** 
(0,313) 
-0,380* 
(0,243) 
-0.601* 
(0,855) 
-0,39** 
(-2.0)a 
-1,2*** 
(-9.2)a 
Troughi,t-1* transition
 
  
0,220 
(1,549) 
-2,618*** 
(0,855) 
  
Number of observations 3348 2366 3348 2366 3033 1714 
*: significance at the 10%; ** significance at the 5%; *** significance at the 1%; a Standard errors are in parenthesis 
below the coefficients, except in the last two columns, where they are replaced by T-stats.  
 
3.3. Separating “transitional recessions” from “normal” recessions 
We extend the basic analysis to verify (i) whether there are different behaviors in CEE 
(EU10 and Western Balkans)7 and CIS countries (low income and middle income CIS countries)8 
and (ii) whether there are differences in the output response to “transitional recession” and “normal” 
                                                 
7
 EU10 plus Croatia, i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia; Western Balkans, i.e. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia and 
Montenegro. 
8
 Middle income CIS: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Ukraine; Low income CIS: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
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recessions. The latter is achieved by running separate regressions for the period post-1992 and post 
19959.  
The results are summarized in Tables 3a and 3b and suggest that: (i) the negative effect of 
transitional recession is much smaller in EU10 (-2.073) than in low (-3.545) and middle income CIS 
countries (-3.579); (ii) in the post transitional recession period (post-1995, to take into account the 
delayed transition in CIS countries) the coefficient of recession on subsequent growth is 
insignificant for EU10 countries, whereas it remains significant, negative and large for low income 
(-3.456) and middle income (-3.431) CIS countries. 
Tables 3a and 3b: Is strength of recovery different in transition countries? 
Table 3a 
Gdp growth from 1992  explained by :  
Dummy trough 
lagged :  
Troughi,t-1
 
-0.601** 
(0.34) 
-0.877*** 
(0.324) 
-1.048*** 
(0.316) 
-0.919*** 
(0.317) 
-0.856*** 
(0.320) 
Troughi,t-1* 
transition 
-2.61*** 
(0.85) 
    
Troughi,t-1* EU10
 a
 
 
-2.073* 
(1.246) 
   
Troughi,t-1* WB
 b
 
  
1.698 
(2.341) 
  
Troughi,t-1* MiCIS
 
c
 
   
-3.579** 
(1.915) 
 
Troughi,t-1* LiCIS
 
d
 
    
-3.545*** 
(1.504) 
F-statistics 9.97 6.65 5.53 7.02 8.02 
Number of 
observations 
2366 2366 2366 2366 2366 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 For robustness check, we run also regression for post 1998, although the number of observations falls to a low figure.  
Results are available upon request.  
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Table 3b 
Gdp growth from 1995  explained by :  
Dummy trough 
lagged :  
Troughi,t-1
 
-0.783** 
(0.431) 
-1.128*** 
(0.404) 
-1.244*** 
(0.401) 
-1.066*** 
(0.405) 
-1.024*** 
(0.407) 
Troughi,t-1* 
transition 
-2.748*** 
(1.093) 
    
Troughi,t-1* EU10
 a
 
 
-2.167 
(2.069) 
   
Troughi,t-1* WB
 b
 
  
1.590 
(2.746) 
  
Troughi,t-1* MiCIS
 c
 
   
-3.431* 
(1.975) 
 
Troughi,t-1* LiCIS
 d
 
    
-3.456** 
(1.757) 
F-statistics 7.83 5.21 4.82 6.17 6.60 
Number of 
observations 
1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 
a
 EU10: see Note 5; b Western Balkans: see Note 5; c Middle income CIS: see Note 6; d Low income CIS: see Note 6. 
*: significance at the 10%; ** significance at the 5%; *** significance at the 1% 
Standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients 
 
 
Overall, these results suggest that the initial transitional recession did not lead to subsequent 
benefits in terms of growth, at least during a five year interval after the start of transition. However, 
for the episodes of crises after the transitional recession, there is no negative effect for CEE 
countries, while the negative effect persists for CIS countries. This implies that the ability of CEEs 
to recover from a crisis by unleashing productive forces after a recession is much larger than in CIS. 
In summary, after 20 years from the start of transition it seems that CIS countries have not 
yet fully exploited potential growth benefits of market reforms. Neglecting possible heterogeneity 
within the CIS group, we can conclude that from the perspective of growth transition so far has 
been a failure in CIS countries.  
We also tried to assess whether there is an asymmetry in the growth response to recessions 
between CEE and CIS countries, controlling for the type of crises associated with such recessions: 
currency and banking crises, civil war and political change.  
We analyze as well whether the response following a recession may differ depending on the 
reform policies associated to temporary output fall, in particular trade and financial liberalization, 
although the sign (positive or negative) of the impact is uncertain. Results, summarized in Table 4 
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confirm that the negative performance of CIS countries cannot be attributed to the nature of the 
crisis they faced. But somehow puzzlingly, this negative performance looks like the one of 
countries that experienced civil wars.  
 
Table 4: Explaining transition specificity 
Gdp growth after 1992  explained by : 
Dummy trough lagged 
Troughi,t-1
  
-1.269*** 
(0.366) 
-0.884*** 
(0.348) 
-1.230** 
(0.564) 
-1.261 
(0,863) 
-0.866*** 
(0.317) 
-0.828** 
(0.401) 
Troughi,t-1*Low income 0.943 
(0.708) 
     
Troughi,t-1*Banking Crisis  -0.664 
(0.762) 
    
Troughi,t-1*Trade Liberalization   0.531 
(0.654) 
   
Troughi,t-1*Financial Liberalization    0,332 
(1.224) 
  
Troughi,t-1*Civil War     -5.255*** 
(1.823) 
 
Troughi,t-1* governmental change       -1.119 
(0.870) 
F-Statistics 6.15 5.65 4.47 8.35 9.44 4.98 
Number of observations 2366 2366 1567 1027 2366 1976 
*: significance at the 10%; ** significance at the 5%; *** significance at the 1% 
Standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients 
 
One explanation behind the dismal growth results obtained for CIS countries might be the 
piecemeal and erratic path of reforms followed in CIS countries, as opposed to the more steady and 
broad-based approach followed in CEE countries. In the following section, we analyze whether 
reform complementarity is the key behind those contrasting patterns of growth after crisis.  
 
4. Reform complementarities and crisis 
 
The breadth of reforms that are needed to move from a planned to a market economy is 
undoubtedly much larger than any other experience of reforms in market economies. In this respect, 
transition has been a unique experience, as reforms had to be implemented in all economic and 
institutional areas typical of a market economy. Braga de Macedo and Oliveira-Martins (2008) have 
constructed a coherence index of reforms based on EBRD indicators. The index measures the 
degree of co-movement in the various types of reforms. They find that the index has a positive 
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effect on growth, controlling for the effect of the overall level of reform. In summary, in addition to 
the extent of reform, the implementation of reforms in areas that are likely to be complementary has 
a positive effect on growth.  
Unfortunately, data on a large set of reforms comparable to those included in the EBRD 
transition index are not available for the large set of countries we consider in our study. To maintain 
the comparative dimension of our analysis, we decided to focus on two main areas of reform, 
financial reform and trade liberalization. Therefore, this choice was partly driven by data 
limitations, but at the same time we believe that restricting the analysis to trade and financial 
reforms may actually strengthen the results, as the possible complementarities between these two 
types of reforms have solid theoretical foundations. In contrast, from a theoretical point of view 
there are no clear predictions on the implications of complementarities among diverse areas of 
reform, such as privatization, price liberalization, non-banking sector reform etc.. Financial sector 
reform in itself contains different elements and this allows us to implement an analysis on the 
complementarities between different reform elements.  
The effect of opening up and liberalizing the financial sector are likely to depend on the 
quality of institutions relating to contract enforcement, information and other crucial institutional 
areas affecting the functioning of the financial sector. Furthermore, there are several studies 
pointing to the interconnections between liberalization and market structure, such as competition 
and barriers to entry in the domestic banking sector. Therefore, the effects of opening up the system 
to capital flows or liberalizing interest rate setting may have different effects depending on the 
degree of competition in the domestic banking sector.10  In summary, we acknowledge the 
limitations of focusing on two areas of reforms, but, at the same time, we claim that coherence 
among different dimensions of financial sector reform is likely to have significant effects on 
economic performance, and that financial and trade liberalization are likely to have strong 
complementarities.  
                                                 
10
 See among others Cetorelli and Gambera (2001). 
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In the recent dataset constructed by the Abiad et al. (2008), financial reform contains seven 
different indicators, which relate to different areas of reforms. In particular, among these indicators 
one can distinguish institutional aspects affecting the functioning and efficiency of the financial 
sector and policy measures relating to liberalization and opening up of the financial sector. Our 
empirical strategy is straightforward. We follow Braga de Macedo and Oliveira-Martins (2008) and 
construct an indicator of reform complementarities. Our approach main differs with respect to 
previous analyses in two main aspects. First, as noted above, rather than looking at a broad set of 
reforms for which there are no strong priors about the relevance of complementarities, we focus on 
main economic reforms, relating to financial liberalization, opening of the capital account, 
institutional building in the financial sector and trade liberalization (Christiansen et al., 2010). 
Second, we analyze the impact of reforms on recession episodes and the rebound following 
recessions, rather than average growth rates. Specifically, the capacity to rebound, the depth of 
recessions and its persistence are likely to be lower under higher complementarities.  In summary, 
we verify empirically whether reform complementarities could be one of the elements explaining 
the different performance of CEEs with respect to CIS countries. 
 
4.1. Financial Reform and Trade Liberalization Data 
Summary statistics for each component of the financial reform database and trade 
liberalization are reported in table 5 for EU10 and CIS countries (in Appendix 2 we report details at 
the country level). We cover a period of 16 years, from 1989 to 2005.  
Regarding financial reform, before 1989, transition countries’ banking and financial sectors 
were under the control of the governments. After 1989, as in other countries in the original sample, 
financial systems were liberalized in the areas of interest rate controls, bank entry, and capital 
account restrictions, while bank supervision and regulation lagged behind. The values taken by the 
privatization index constitute the only exception. They are quite low, especially in the CIS, 
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reflecting the specificity of the transition countries and the inheritance of the formerly planned 
systems.  
The first dimension is credit controls and reserve requirements. The first variable reflects 
directed lending, supported by subsidized rates, to priority sectors for industrial policy. The second 
variable captures the presence of excessively high reserve requirements imposed by governments on 
banks. This indicator does not differ significantly across transition countries. The mean in the EU10 
(CIS) is equal to 1.94 (1.86), and the variance is 0.47 (0.65).  
The second dimension, interest rate controls, the most common form of financial repression, 
corresponds to a situation where the government controls both lending and deposit rates. Here there 
is more heterogeneity. The indicator yields a mean value of 2.80 for EU10, and 2.00 for CIS.  
The third dimension, privatization, depicts situations where major banks are state-owned 
and/or the percentage of public bank assets is from 50 to 100%, to situations where such banks do 
not exist anymore. In this dimension the performance of the CIS is poor (the mean value is 0.98), 
while in the EU10 it is significantly better, reaching a mean value of 1.48.  
The fourth dimension, entry barriers, reflects a situation where the entry of competitors (e.g. 
foreign banks and non-financial intermediaries) is restricted. The data indicate a more liberalized 
pattern in the EU10 than in the CIS (the means are respectively 2.83 and 2.29, with variance equal 
to 0.16 and 1.03, respectively).   
The fifth dimension, capital account restrictions, is intended to give the government greater 
control over the flow of credit and over the exchange rate. The mean is 2.13 for the EU10 (variance 
being equal to 1.45); it is set equal to 1.68 for the CIS, reflecting a lower degree of financial 
openness in the latter countries.  
The sixth dimension, prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector, is the 
only dimension, out of the seven, where a greater degree of intervention is coded as a reform. It 
yields a mean value of 1.55 in the EU10, and 1.06 in the CIS, reflecting higher risky behaviors, less 
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independence of the banking supervisory agency and lower efficiency of examinations of banks in 
the latter countries.  
The seventh and last dimension, securities market policies, includes the auctioning of 
government securities, establishment of debt and equity markets, and policies to encourage the 
development of such markets and openness of securities markets to foreign investors. Again the 
data reflect a better situation in the EU10 (the mean is 2.11) than in the CIS (1.32).  
Finally, the trade liberalization indicators clearly show that EU10 have achieved much 
higher levels of liberalization than CIS countries.  
 
Table 5.  Indicators of financial and trade liberalization
Mean Min Max Variance Mean Min Max Variance
Financial liberalization
Credit controls 1.94 0.75 3 0.47 1.86 0 3 0.65
Interest rate controls 2.8 0 3 0.41 2 0 3 1.57
Entry barriers 2.83 1 3 0.16 2.29 0 3 1.03
Banking supervision 1.55 0 3 1.16 1.06 0 2 0.78
Privatization 1.48 0 3 1.74 0.98 0 3 1.34
Capital account 2.13 0 3 1.45 1.68 0 3 1.2
Security markets 2.11 0 3 1.27 1.32 0 3 0.94
Aggregate measure of financial liberalization 0.71 0.08 1 0.05 0.53 0.03 0.91 0.04
Trade liberalization 0.297 0 1 0.457 0.076 0 1 0.070
EU10 countries CIS countries
 
 
We explore whether reform momentum is concentrated in some reform areas or more evenly 
distributed. The underlying assumption is that a non-consistent and piecemeal strategy, where some 
areas are restructured deeply while others remain unreformed, will yield a negative outcome. As in 
Braga de Macedo and Oliveira-Martins (2008), this phenomenon could be explained by the theory 
of second best, according to which in a highly distorted system, reducing one distortion may 
actually worsen the outcome.   
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A few examples can illustrate this view. Relaxing the level of financial repression makes no 
sense if entry barriers are not removed at the same time, allowing competition over the allocation of 
credit to increase the level of efficiency. Allowing more banks to enter the market and alleviating 
the restrictions imposed on their activities can be counterproductive if supervision of the banking 
system does not control for a proper functioning of the market. Moral hazard and adverse selection 
are a very likely outcome in the absence of regulations and supervision: banks continue to lend to 
non profitable firms and this retards the restructuring process, the hardening of the budget 
constraint, and the implementation of bankruptcy procedures. A too high share of public assets and 
a too high number of state-owned banks may be incompatible with abolishing controls on banking 
activities. To illustrate the idea that complementarities among reform matter for the effects of 
reforms on outcomes, let us consider an example with three reforms, which can take values between 
1 and 4. Complementarity has positive effects when a move from (1,1,1) to (2,2,2) leads to better 
outcomes than a move to (4,1,1), although both moves imply the same average level of reform. A 
simple way to capture this is to measure the concentration of reforms by means of the Hirschmann-
Herfindhal indicator and take the reciprocal of it as an index of reform complementarity:  
( )( )∑=
i
jtijt
jt fNf
Compl 2
ReRe
1
 
Where Compljt stands for the complementary index between reforms i for country j and in 
year t; jtfRe  is the simple average, year by year, for country j, over the financial and trade reform 
dimensions indicated above; N is the number of reforms and is equal to 7 for financial reforms and 
8 when we include as well trade liberalization. A higher value of Compljt denotes a higher 
complementarity (and lower concentration). We compute three indicators of complementarity: (1) 
of financial reforms only, (2) of both financial and trade reforms, weighted, and (3) of financial and 
trade reforms, un-weighted.  According to figure 1 below, complementarity was consistently higher 
in EU10 countries than in CIS countries, whatever the indicator under consideration (see Appendix 
2 for details at the country level).  
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Figure 1  
a.  Complementarity of financial reforms 
 
b.  Complementarity of trade and financial reforms, unweighted 
 
c . Complementarity of trade and financial reforms, weigthed  
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4.2. Empirical analysis 
We now turn to the main issue raised in this paper, namely how do countries react to crisis in the 
short run and link such reaction to reforms. We ask whether the years of positive growth after a 
crisis are sufficient to retrieve the level of growth which prevailed before the crisis, and whether 
transition countries differ from the general pattern. To answer those questions, the indicators 
presented in the previous section, financial reforms (FinRef), trade liberalization (TradeRef) and 
reform complementarities (Compl), are related to the capacity to rebound, the depth and length of 
the crisis. We estimate the three equations below: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
jtititititit
itititititit
jttititititiittiiitit
XbComplbfFinbfTradebbLength
vXaComplafFinafTradeaaDepth
uXTroughXComplTroughComplTroughagg
ε
γγγγβ
+++++=
+++++=
++++++=
−−−>
4321
4321
,1,4,3,1,211,0
ReRe
ReRe
**/
 
 
The first equation refers to the capacity to rebound. The hypothesis is that less dispersion in 
reform implementation should allow a better catch-up to the pre-crisis level of GDP; we take the ex 
ante level of reform complementarity, i.e. the year t-1 preceding the rebound. For this assumption to 
be validated, γ2 should be positive. We control for fixed effects and macro-policy measures Xi,t, 
proxied by the rate of inflation in the year of recovery. The impact of reform complementarity and 
macroeconomic stability on the strength of the rebound following a recession is measured by the 
interaction of Compli,t-1 and Xi,t  with the dummy Troughi,t-1. The database covers the period from 
1992 to 2007, for 91 countries of the world, which makes a maximum of 1365 observations. 
The second and third equations refer to the depth (cumulative GDP loss during the years of 
negative growth rates) and the length (number of years of negative rates of growth) of recessions, 
respectively.  For depth and length, we constructed an unbalanced panel covering 91 countries and 
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17 years (1989-2005), which includes a total of about 200 crises. We use the same controls as for 
the rebound equation.  
Previous literature has shown that the evidence on the effect of reforms on growth in 
transition countries is mixed. Babetskii and Campos (2007) carried out a meta-analysis of 43 
econometric studies and found that the evidence on a positive effect on growth is rather weak. 
Interestingly, they find that a source of the weak results lies in the lack of control for potential 
endogeneity and reverse causality in the econometric studies. Controlling for endogeneity sharply 
improves the results and the evidence on the positive effect of reforms on growth in transition 
countries becomes much more robust.  
In our approach, the sources of endogeneity appear weaker, as the focus of our empirical 
analysis is on episodes of crises, rather than average rate of growth in a given period. Furthermore, 
our indicator of reforms is ex ante and characterizes the countries just before the episodes of crises. 
Nevertheless, we admit that endogeneity and reverse causality may exist. Therefore, our analysis 
can be considered as merely stressing significant correlations between reform complementarities 
and the severity of the crisis.  
Results for the capacity to rebound equation are reported in table 6 below. They show that 
complementarity, whatever measure we use, does not affect the capacity to rebound, which 
confirms the result on the level of reforms contained in Table 4. This result seems puzzling. 
However, our interpretation is that during the rebound the economy recovers by using previously 
unused capacity accumulated during the recession. The pure recovery phase may therefore have 
little to do with efficient reallocation of resources, which is likely to depend on the extent and 
complementarity of reforms. Notice that a sound macroeconomic policy proxied by the rate of 
inflation matters for the rebound, which turns out to be stronger at lower rates of inflation.  
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Table 6: Capacity to rebound and complementarity of reform 
 
Complementarity of trade and 
financial reforms, unweighted 
Complementarity of trade and financial 
reforms, weighted 
 
1 2 3 4 
Troughi,t-1
 
-0.376 
(1.330) 
0.253 
(1.434) 
0.319 
(1.200) 
0.587 
(1.245) 
Troughi,t-1*Complementarity
 
-0.048 
(0.206) 
-0.097 
(0.223) 
-0.0.13 
(0.015) 
-0.013 
(0.159) 
Complementarity of reforms 0.164 
(0.139) 
0.048 
(0.147) 
0.057 
(0.103) 
-0.052 
(0.109) 
Troughi,t-1*inflation
 
 
-0.033** 
(0.015) 
 
-0.031** 
(0.157) 
inflation
 
 
0.0004 
(0.0008) 
 
0.0004 
(0.0008) 
Constant 3.407*** 
(0.925) 
4.071*** 
(0.979) 
4.025*** 
(0.845) 
4.822*** 
(0.897) 
F-Statistics 3.36 2.51 3.16 2.74 
Number of observations 929 766 929 766 
*: significance at the 10%; ** significance at the 5%; *** significance at the 1% 
Standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients 
 
  Different considerations apply to the depth and length of recessions. In this case, it is conceivable 
that complementarity of reforms play a role. Results for the depth and length equations are 
presented in tables 7 and 8 below.11 We report estimates only for the weighted measure of 
complementarity. Overall, reforms alone are never significant, which means that countries which 
have reformed less in a given area do not tend to have longer and deeper crisis.  
Interestingly from our perspective, complementarity has the expected negative impact on 
depth and length. This holds for complementarity of financial reforms and complementarity of 
financial sector and trade reforms, both weighted and unweighted. 12 Using a different measure of 
complementarity, and taking into account the fact that policy dispersion can be caused by growth, 
Braga de Macedo et al. (2010) run 3SLS and show that policy dispersion reduces average growth. 
Their recent contribution is close to the results presented here. 
                                                 
11
 Given that the number of crises in transition countries is quite limited we have not been able to run any econometric 
exercise (see Appendix 3 for the listing of depth and length in transition countries). We checked that transition countries 
do not differ from the general pattern emerging from our broader sample (results available upon request). 
12
 Results with other measures of complementarity, with and without additional controls (inflation) yield the same 
conclusions, and are not reported here for saving space. They are available upon request. 
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Table 7: Depth of the crisis and complementary of financial and trade reforms, weighted 
Dependent variable : Depth 
Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
          
Constant  8,545*** 8,486*** 8,773*** 8,166**
* 
8,070*** 8,315*** 7,823*** 8,328*** 
 
 (1,666) (1,538) (1,538) (1,870) (1,503) (1,487) (1,507) (1,489) 
Credit controls  0,231 - - - - - - - 
  (0,708)        
Interest rate controls - 0,068 - - - - - - 
   (0,513)       
Entry barriers  - - 1,863* - - - - - 
    (0,876)      
Banking supervision - - - -0,305 - - - - 
     (0,678)     
Privatization  - - - - -0,750 - - - 
 
     (0,402)    
Capital account  - - - - - -0,704 - - 
       (0,585)   
Security markets  - - - - - - -0,858 - 
        (0,562)  
Trade liberalization  - - - - - - - -1,556 
         (1,071) 
Complementarity of 
trade and financial 
reforms, weighted 
 
-0,721* -0, 669** -1, 228*** -0, 563* -0, 428* -0, 423* -0, 327 -0, 466** 
  (0, 377) (0, 290) (0, 404) (0, 337) (0, 231) (0, 251) (0, 280) (0,221) 
R-squared  0,060 0,060 0,112 0,061 0,069 0,067 0,068 0,069 
Number of observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 
*: significance at the 10%; ** significance at the 5%; *** significance at the 1% 
Standard errors are in brackets.  
 
Moreover, the results are quantitatively relevant. According to table 7, an increase in 
weighted complementarity by one standard deviation (equal to 2.532) can reduce the depth of the 
crisis by a factor ranging from 1.07 up to 3.11 percentage points (we take the max and min out of 
the complementarity coefficients, which are respectively -1.228 and -0.423 in table 7 and we 
multiply them by the standard deviation associated with the weighted measure of complementarity). 
Transition countries have followed very different transition patterns – reforms being implemented 
in a more or less consistent way or not implemented at all. For instance while the level of reform 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.20
 24 
complementarity is dramatically low in a country like Belarus13, even 15 years after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, it stands at a very high level in Latvia14, close to the EU standard, especially from 2000 
onwards. If Belarus were to attain the same level of complementarity as in Latvia, then according to 
our estimates the increase in growth could range from 1.31 to 3.82 percentage points.15   
 
Table 8: Length of the crisis and complementary of financial and trade reforms, weighted 
Dependent variable : Length 
Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
          
Constant  2,166*** 2,146*** 2,145*** 2,115*** 2,084*** 2,131*** 2,092*** 2,118*** 
  (0,298) (0,280 (0,278) (0,337) (0,270) (0,282) (0,272) (0,279) 
Credit controls  0,090 - - - - - - - 
  (0,125)        
Interest rate controls - 0,031 - - - - - - 
   (0,079)       
Entry barriers  - - 0,121 - - - - - 
 
   (0,106)      
Banking supervision - - - -0,009 - - - - 
 
    (0,112)     
Privatization  - - - - -0,080 - - - 
 
     (0,069)    
Capital account  - - - - - 0,047 - - 
       (0,127)   
Security markets  - - - - - - -0,043 - 
        (0,093)  
Trade liberalization  - - - - - - - -0,074 
         (0,238) 
Complementarity of trade 
and financial reforms, 
weighted 
 
-0,132** -0, 
114** 
-0, 
138*** 
-0, 098* -0, 078* -0, 115* -0, 085* -0,09* 
  (0,064) (0, 049) (0, 053) (0, 059) (0, 040) (0, 061) (0, 047) (0,05) 
R-squared  0,050 0,048 0,055 0,048 0,051 0,049 0,048 0,048 
Number of observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 
 
*: significance at the 10%; ** significance at the 5%; *** significance at the 1% 
Standard errors are in brackets 
 
Table 8 reports the results for the length of recession. Similarly to the analysis of the depth variable, 
reforms are not significant when they are considered one by one, but complementarity matters, 
whatever the specification. However, quantitatively the effect is not very large. An increase in 
                                                 
13
 The level of weighted complementarity stands at 5.5 for Belarus. See Appendix 2.  
14
 The level of weighted complementarity stands at 8,61 for Latvia. See Appendix 2. 
15
 3.82 = 3.11 (the difference in complementarity of trade and financial reforms weighted), times minus 1,228 (the 
maximum value out of the estimates in table 7).  
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weighted complementarity by one standard deviation can reduce the length of the crisis by a factor 
ranging from 0.19 up to 0.35 year, that is about 2.37 and 4.19 months (as for depth, we take the max 
and min out of the complementarity coefficients and we multiply them by one standard deviation). 
Consider again the above scenario with Belarus reaching the level of complementarity achieved in 
Latvia, the length of recessions would decrease by a period ranging from 2.91 to 5.15 months.  
Results on depth and length of recessions are in line with those obtained by Braga de Macedo et 
al. (2010) for the average growth rate. Putting together our results on the three dimensions, rebound, 
depth and length, it emerges a picture in which the effect on average growth found in the previous 
literature is likely to arise because of the effect of complementarity on the depth and length of 
recessions, rather than in the rebound period. In summary, piecemeal reforms seem to expose 
countries to more severe contractions in economic activity. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we analyzed the growth experience in the first twenty years of transition from a 
comparative perspective. We followed the lead of recent theoretical and empirical analysis of 
growth and development and tried to analyze growth in transition in a unified framework including 
the initial transitional recession, the subsequent recovery and growth and the subsequent episodes of 
crises experienced by transition countries. 
Our results suggest that in terms of growth transition has been disappointing in CIS 
countries, whereas has produced positive effects in CEE countries. We tried to link such results to 
the different reform paths followed by the two groups of countries. We conjectured that the still 
incomplete reform process, the piecemeal approach followed by CIS countries might be one of the 
explanations for the dismal results in terms of growth displayed by CIS countries in the first 20 
years of transition. Our analysis is extremely partial and focuses only on one dimension of 
economic performance, namely real GDP growth. Nevertheless, we feel that any type of broader 
analysis cannot neglect the role of growth as an indicator of success of transition.  
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From the evidence presented in the paper we draw three main conclusions, which are 
relevant as well for future research. First, the comparative perspective provides useful information 
on the specific features of transition countries. Analyses based on samples composed solely by 
transition countries neglect extremely useful information and can thus be misleading. Second, 
analyses based on average rates of growth, as typically done in the literature, may as well produce 
misleading results, as the role of initial conditions and policies may vary significantly depending on 
whether countries are in periods of deep recession, periods of recovery or period of sustained 
growth. Finally, as already explored in the literature (Braga de Macedo and Oliveira Martins (2008) 
and Braga de Macedo et al. (2010)), the impact of reforms crucially depends on the 
complementarity of reforms. Focusing on two specific dimensions, namely reforms affecting the 
financial sector and trade liberalization, we showed that reform complementarity has an impact on 
output performance mainly through the depth and length of recessions, rather than the rebound of 
the economy following recessions. 
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Appendix 1: Real GDP levels by (transition) country, base 100 = 1990 
A. Eu-10 countries 
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B. CIS countries 
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C. Western Balban countries 
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Appendix 2: Reform indicators by (transition) country 
Country  Credit 
Controls 
Interest Rates 
Controls 
Entry  
Barriers 
Banking  
Supervision 
Privatization Capital  
Account 
Security  
Markets CEECs 
Bulgaria Mean  2,25 2,07 2,80 0,87 1,00 2,07 0,93 
 Var 0,72 1,07 0,17 0,70 1,71 0,78 0,07 
Czech Rep Mean  1,73 2,81 2,88 1,44 1,69 1,75 2,50 
 Var 0,28 0,56 0,12 0,40 1,43 2,07 1,20 
Estonia Mean  2,45 3,00 2,80 1,73 2,33 2,60 2,27 
 Var 0,20 0,00 0,17 1,78 1,38 0,69 1,50 
Hungary Mean  1,73 3,00 2,63 2,06 1,75 2,31 2,25 
 Var 0,13 0,00 0,25 1,26 2,07 1,03 0,87 
Lituania Mean  1,88 2,71 2,93 1,43 1,29 2,79 1,93 
 Var 0,24 0,53 0,07 0,73 1,60 0,64 1,30 
Latvia Mean  2,89 3,00 2,79 1,93 2,57 2,79 1,93 
 Var 0,16 0,00 0,18 1,15 1,19 0,64 1,30 
Poland Mean  1,36 3,00 2,94 1,75 0,69 1,88 2,75 
 Var 0,09 0,00 0,06 1,93 0,50 2,25 0,60 
Romania Mean  1,41 2,81 2,88 1,19 0,63 1,06 2,19 
 Var 0,14 0,56 0,25 0,70 1,05 1,40 1,76 
CIS  
Azerbaidjan Mean  2,33 2,33 1,80 0,47 0,07 2,47 0,67 
 Var 0,81 0,95 1,89 0,55 0,07 0,84 0,24 
Belarus Mean  1,50 0,00 3,00 0,93 0,00 1,36 2,86 
 Var 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,71 0,29 
Georgia Mean  1,95 3,00 2,40 1,73 2,00 2,80 1,60 
 Var 0,23 0,00 0,69 1,35 2,14 0,17 0,26 
Kazakhstan Mean  2,30 2,07 1,07 1,47 2,00 0,93 0,93 
 Var 0,68 1,50 0,07 0,70 1,00 0,07 0,64 
Kyrgystan Mean  2,05 2,33 2,67 0,80 1,53 2,60 0,73 
 Var 0,68 1,52 0,24 0,31 1,41 1,11 0,21 
Russia Mean  2,60 3,00 3,00 0,92 1,00 2,00 2,31 
 Var 0,34 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,50 1,40 
Ukraine Mean  1,45 2,67 3,00 1,13 1,20 0,93 0,93 
 Var 0,04 0,24 0,00 1,70 1,03 0,35 0,07 
Uzbekistan Mean  0,85 0,67 1,53 1,07 0,00 0,40 0,80 
 Var 0,31 0,24 1,55 0,64 0,00 0,26 0,17 
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country   Trade 
liberalization 
Financial 
reforms 
Compl., financial 
reforms only 
Compl., financial 
reforms and trade, 
Compl., financial 
reforms and trade, CEECs 
Bulgaria Mean  0,36 0,57 5,07 5,77 6,60 
 Var 0,24 0,04 1,45 1,32 3,40 
Czech Rep Mean  0,36 0,70 5,63 6,22 7,61 
 Var 0,24 0,05 2,42 2,74 4,67 
Estonia Mean  0,00 0,82 6,13 5,82 8,14 
 Var 0,00 0,06 1,69 1,95 3,83 
Hungary Mean  0,38 0,75 6,06 6,71 8,09 
 Var 0,24 0,06 1,16 1,00 3,05 
Lituania Mean  0,32 0,71 5,73 6,31 7,75 
 Var 0,22 0,05 1,80 2,09 3,48 
Latvia Mean  0,32 0,85 6,27 6,81 8,61 
 Var 0,22 0,04 1,46 1,78 2,81 
Poland Mean  0,38 0,68 5,27 5,88 7,15 
 Var 0,24 0,04 2,14 2,10 4,21 
Romania Mean  0,34 0,58 4,78 5,33 6,43 
 Var 0,23 0,05 2,61 3,10 4,73 
Slovakia Mean  0,36     
 Var 0,24     
Slovenia Mean  0,36     
 Var 0,24     
CIS 
Azerbaidjan Mean   0,48 4,02   
 Var  0,02 1,02   
Belarus Mean  0,00 0,46 4,03 3,93 5,50 
 Var 0,00 0,00 0,22 0,27 0,53 
Georgia Mean   0,74 5,98   
 Var  0,05 1,50   
Kazakhstan Mean  0,00 0,51 5,15 4,88 6,83 
 Var 0,00 0,03 1,21 1,40 2,73 
Kyrgystan Mean  0,30 0,61 5,04 5,55 6,78 
 Var 0,21 0,04 3,14 4,08 5,50 
Russia Mean  0,00 0,71 5,80 5,66 7,92 
 Var 0,00 0,01 0,37 0,48 0,93 
Tajikistan Mean  0,26     
 Var 0,19     
Ukraine Mean  0,00 0,54 4,96 4,59 6,42 
 Var 0,00 0,02 1,38 1,36 2,66 
Uzbekistan Mean  0,00 0,25 3,58 3,08 4,31 
 Var 0,00 0,03 3,23 3,50 6,85 
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Appendix 3: Depth & Length of the crisis by (transition) country 
A. Eu-10 countries 
Country Recession Type of crisis Date  Lenght Depth 
1 Government change & trade liberalisation  1989 4 23.98 
2 Banking crisis & trade liberalisation 1995 2 14.47 Bulgaria 
Average . . 3.5 20.48 
1 Banking crisis & trade liberalisation 1989 3 13.12 
2 trade liberalisation 1996 2 1.48 Czech Republic 
Average . . 2 6.78 
1 Government change & civil war 1989 3 35.28 
2 Government change  1998 1 0.86 Croatian 
Average . . 1.5 15.60 
Hungary 1 Trade liberalization, Government change & banking crisis in 1991 1989 4 18.05 
1 Government change & trade liberalisation in 1993 1989 5 46.66 
2 trade liberalisation 1998 1 1.70 Lituania 
Average . . 3 24.18 
1 Government  change  1989 4 48.10 
2  Banking crisis & trade liberalisation 1994 1 0.94 Latvia 
Average . . 2 24.52 
Poland 1 Trade liberalization, Government  
change & banking crisis  1989 2 17.79 
1 Civil war, Government  change & banking crisis  1988 4 29.39 
2 trade liberalisation & banking crisis 1996 3 11.67 Romania 
Average . . 3.5 20.53 
Slovakia 1 Trade liberalisation & banking crisis  1989 4 25.31 
Slovenia 1 Trade liberalisation in 1991  1989 3 20.34 
 
Country Recession Date (average) Length Depth 
1 1989 3.6 27.80 
2 1996 1.7 5.19 EU-10 countries 
Average . 2.88 19.32 
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B. CIS  countries 
Country Recession Type of crisis Date  Lenght Depth 
Armenia 1 Government change & civil war  1989 4 56.60 
Azerbaidjan 1 Government  change & civil war  1989 6 63.04 
Belarus 1 Government  change in 1991 1989 6 36.67 
Georgia 1 NA 1989 7 76.53 
1 Government  change in 1991 1989 6 38.84 
2 . 1997 1 1.90 Kazakhstan 
Average . . 3.5 20.37 
1 Government  change & banking crisis 1990 5 49.30 
2 Trade liberalisation 2001 1 0.02 
3 Trade liberalisation & gvt change 2004 1 0.18 
Kyrgyzstan 
Average . . 3.5 16.50 
1 Government  change 1989 7 63.57 
2 Trade liberalisation 1997 2 9.68 Moldova 
Average . . 3.5 36.62 
1 Government  change  1989 7 41.91 
2 Banking crisis 1997 1 5.30 Russia 
Average . . 3.5 23.61 
Tajikistan 1 Government change & civil war 1989 7 68.48 
Turkmenistan 1 Government  change  1990 7 48.41 
1 Government  change  1989 7 59.54 
2 Banking crisis 1997 2 2.27 Ukraine 
Average . . 3.5 30.91 
Uzbekistan 1 Government  change  1990 5 18.90 
 
Country Recession Date (average) Length Depth 
1 1989 6.1 53 
2 1998 1.4 3.8 
3 2004 1 0.18 
CIS countries 
Average . 5 35.52 
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C. WB countries 
Country Recession Type of crisis Date  Lenght Depth 
1 Government change 1989 3 39.15 
2 Government change & trade liberalisation 1996 1 10.20 Albania 
Average . . 2 24.67 
1 Government  change & banking crisis in 1993 1989 6 29 
2 Trade liberalisation 2000 1 4.53 
Macedonia 
Average . . 3.5 16.76 
1 Civil war in 1991 1989 4 59.38 
2 NA 1998 1 18 Serbia 
Average . . 2.5 38.69 
 
Country Recession Date (average) Length Depth 
1 1989 4.3 42.51 
2 1998 1 10.91 WB countries 
Average . 2.67 26.71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.20
